And yet Aquinas explicitly considers and rejects key premises of Cassian’s position.2 Seeing how Aquinas responds to Cassian’s worries, and seeing just why Aquinas ultimately rejects Cassian’s position, helps one to grasp better the contours of Aquinas’s view. Cassian’s worries about the morality of anger are worries that Aquinas takes seriously. Second, Cassian presents a strong case in support of a view opposed to Aquinas’s, and does so even while sharing many of Aquinas’s ethical commitments. There are of course numerous disagreements on major issues between key figures in the Christian tradition-my point is merely that an examination of such disagreements often proves to be fruitful. Francis de Sales.1 To my mind, the fact that Aquinas and Cassian disagree on the moral status of anger is an interesting fact, precisely because both Cassian and Aquinas are key figures in the Christian intellectual tradition. Despite his controversial theology of grace, his writings wereĢ esteemed by such luminaries as St. First, Cassian is an influential figure in the history of Christian thought. I have chosen Cassian as a foil for Aquinas for two reasons. I first sketch Cassian’s position and some of the principal considerations that can be marshaled in its favor, and then turn to Aquinas’s account. In what follows I examine and defend Aquinas’s position, using the contrast of Cassian’s views to exhibit Aquinas’s position and arguments in a clearer light. I think Aquinas is right in this debate, and that we can learn something important about the role of anger in the moral life by attending to his views. Thomas Aquinas, taking an Aristotelian line, maintained that anger at another person is sometimes morally virtuous (and, indeed, that a lack of anger is sometimes grounds for moral censure). The 5th Century monk John Cassian took the view that anger at another person is never morally virtuous. Two opposing answers to this question can be found in the Christian intellectual tradition. More specifically, IĪm interested in the question of whether anger at another person is ever a morally excellent thing. INTRODUCTION In this paper I explore two contrasting positions on the moral status of anger.
The first involves the usefulness of anger in the moral life the second focuses on the nature of the human being as a composite of soul and body. The core of my paper consists in a close examination of two arguments given by Aquinas in support of his view. In this paper I explore the positions of Cassian and Aquinas on this issue. Aquinas, taking an Aristotelian line, maintained that anger at another person is sometimes morally virtuous.
John Cassian held that anger at another person is never morally virtuous. THE MORAL STATUS OF ANGER: THOMAS AQUINAS AND JOHN CASSIANĪBSTRACT: Is anger at another person ever a morally excellent thing? Two competing answers to this question can be found in the Christian intellectual tradition.